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ĐSLAM’IN MĐLLĐLEŞTĐRĐLMESĐNDEN MĐLLĐYETÇĐLĐĞĐN
ÖZELLEŞTĐRILMESĐNE: ĐSLAMĐYET VE TÜRK MĐLLĐ KĐMLĐĞĐ
Tamer BALCI*

ÖZET
Bu makale Türkiye’de dinin millileştirilmesi ile ilgili farklı
projeleri içermektedir. Đlk önerilen projeler Đslam ve laikliğin
birarada yaşayabilmesini sağlayabilecek felsefi temelden yoksun
oldukları için başarılı olamamışlardır. Dinin millileştirilmesi
konusunda daha önce yapılan çalışmalardan farklı olarak bu
makale konuyu Soğuk Savaş dönemine taşıyarak Türk-Đslam
Sentezi’nin dinin millileştirilmesi çabalarının ulaştığı son aşama
olduğu tezini vurgulamaktadır. TĐS’in Atatürkçülük rejimini
değiştirme gibi bir hedefi olmaması ve Đslam’ın milliyetçilik, laiklik
ve Atatürkçülük ile uyum içinde olduğu görüşlerini savunması
TĐS’in aranan milli din olmasa bile Đslam ve laik devlet arasında bir
sistem ayarlaması yapmasını sağlamış ve Đslam’ın gayr-i resmi
olarak Türklük tanımına dahil olmasını sağlamıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türklük, Đslam, Türk-Đslam Sentezi,
Türk milliyetçiliği
FROM NATIONALIZATION OF ISLAM TO PRIVATIZATION OF
NATIONALISM: ISLAM AND TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY1

ABSTRACT
This article traces the origins of various proposals to
nationalize Islam in Turkey. The initial Turkish proposals failed
because none of them had a feasible philosophical base to facilitate
the co-existence of Islam and secularism. Aside from the previous
studies on the nationalization of Islam, this article carries the topic
*
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to the Cold War by arguing that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was
the last stage on the nationalization of Islam. Since TIS had no
vision to alter the official ideology, Kemalism, and it claimed the
compatibility of Islam, nationalism, secularism as well as
Kemalism, it fulfilled the need of a national religion the Turkish
state envisioned but it created a de facto Turkish national identity
that made Islam a prerequisite for Turkishness.
Key Words: Turkish identity, Islam, Turkish-Islamic
Synthesis, Turkish nationalism
As secularism entered the Middle East, an ideological battle ensued
between Islam and secular nationalism that would last throughout the twentieth
century. Secular nationalism won mostly the minds of intellectuals and politicians,
who then designed public education systems to win over the conservative masses.
Ruling elites knew well that a constantly open confrontation against Islam would
be counterproductive. Thus, neither Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Kemalist ideology
nor Michel Aflaq’s Baath ideology totally rejected Islam. Instead, they aimed to
harness and use the social power of Islam to further the interests of the nation
state. This would not be possible unless Islam was nationalized by the state.
This article aims to shed light on the multiple outcomes of the
nationalization of Islam in Turkey. I present two interwoven hypotheses to
explain the intricate relationship among the Turkish state, Islam and Turkish
nationalism. Primarily, Turkey’s unrelenting efforts to nationalize Islam during
the early republican period (1923-50) failed but created a de facto Turkish identity
tied to Islam. Despite the constructive aims of the Turkish leaders, nationalization
of Islam could not be achieved because none of the reform proposals had a
feasible philosophical base that could be implemented in the society. They were
cosmetic, unpractical or marginal as it shall be outlined in the following pages.
Nevertheless, when the early Cold War political conditions removed the political
restrictions, a more liberal approach with the checks and balances system paved
the road for the creation of a historical philosophy, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
(TIS) (1950-1970). The TIS formulated the middle way between Islam and the
state and it became the nationalized Turkish Islam. Furthermore, the TIS
strengthened the de facto policy that regards Islam a prerequisite for Turkishness.
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Setting the Goals
The TIS was conceptualized during the Cold War but the raw and
unformulated idea predates modern Turkey. As Islam had been the dominant
socio-cultural force for centuries, early sentiments of Turkish nationalism were
expressed in a religious form. A secular nationalism would not be attractive in a
largely conservative society. Islam and Turkish nationalism blended first in the
frontiers from the Caucasus to the Balkans, where Ottomans retreated. Not
surprisingly many early Turkish nationalists were from these lands. While the
Young Turks were still gathering their thoughts on nationalism, the Balkan Turks
declared in 1898 that “Islam and nationalism had merged into a single construct.”2
Initially, the Young Turk entity, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), did
not take the Islamic blended Turkish nationalism of the local CUP branches
seriously but conditions necessitated the CUP to reconsider this approach.
Nationalist movements in the Balkans, such as the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian
nationalism, went along with Orthodox Christianity. Would the CUP embrace an
Islamic blended Turkish nationalism? Within ten years the CUP not only
recognized Turkism but also exploited it. Turkism, Ottomanism and panIslamism were all at the service of the CUP to reach its political objectives.3 The
CUP did not have a common voice about Turkish nationalism but the positivist
ideology of the leading Young Turks created a tendency toward a secular model.
Whether or not Islam and nationalism would coexist was the question of the time.
From positivist Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) and pan-Turkist Ahmed Ağaoğlu
(1869-1939) to Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) and Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) many
Turkish intellectuals believed in compatibility of Islam and nationalism.
Furthermore, they suggested that nationalism would strengthen the power of Islam
and that Islam should be used to promote the interests of the state.
The ruling elite of the new Turkish Republic turned the Young Turk
ideas into the ideology of the new republic, Kemalism. Gökalp’s ideas shaped the
early cultural policies of the Turkish republic, especially on Islam, secularism and
nationalism. Gökalp derived his ideas and concepts from Emile Durkheim (18582

M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995), 211.
3
M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 296.
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1917) and altered them to fit Turkey. Gökalp’s views in regard to religion were
largely inspired by Durkheim’s last major work of, the Elementary Forms of
Religious Life. This work was an outcome of Durkheim’s research on the
primitive religions of Australian native tribes. Based on this study, Durkheim
drew general conclusions about the interaction of religion and society. He
concentrated on understanding religion as a social reality regardless of its origins.
He criticized positivist scholars for totally rejecting religions because some
religions might have artificial origins. Durkheim argued that “fundamentally,
then, there are no religions that are false. All are true after their own fashion.”4
Furthermore, he pointed out similarities of all religions, saying that “[t]here is no
religion that is not both a cosmology and speculation about the divine.”5
Durkheim concluded in his work that “nearly all the great social institutions were
born in religion…If religion gave birth to all that is essential in society, that is so
because the idea of society is the soul of religion. Thus religious forces are
human forces, moral forces.”6 Religion, according to Durkheim, was an
irreplaceable part of society.
Durkheim regarded religion as a source of morality, consciousness and
identity formation. He acknowledged the role of religion as a motivational source
to unite people and emphasized the significance of social cohesion religion
provides. That social cohesion, according to Durkheim, was almost impossible to
achieve through individualism. In that regard Durkheim believed in the strength
of social action rather than individualism. His reliance on society as opposed to
individualism was his common ground with Karl Marx but as opposed to Marx,
Durkheim made it clear that his approach to religion was sociological not
political.
Durkheim developed general ideas about religion and society. Since he
believed that his findings would apply to all societies, he used a general term
society, without referring to a specific group. His Turkish counterpart, Gökalp
took Durkheim’s general concept of society and narrowed it down to nation.
Then, Gökalp defined what would constitute a nation. For him, millet, nation, was
a community of people united by the same language, religion, morality and
aesthetics. Hence he suggested that Turks should embrace the concept that they

4

Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, (New York: Free Press, 1995),

5

Ibid., 8.
Ibid., 421.

2.
6
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are from the Turkish nation, Islamic faith and the Western civilization.7 Similar
to Durkheim’s approach, Gökalp regarded religion as a corner-stone of society.
Thus, according to Gökalp, Islam was the corner-stone of Turkish nation and the
source of ethics and morality.
Gökalp argued that it was possible to mix Turkish history and culture
with Islam to create a “Turkish-Islamic Historical Philosophy.”8 He believed that
modern science and philosophy could be interpreted based on Turkish and Islamic
traditions and “a modern Turkish-Islamic Civilization”9 would evolve out of it.
What would be the role of religion in this civilization? Gökalp advocated
secularization of the justice system. The laws of the state, he suggested, should
not be determined by religious rules but by the conditions of the society.10 Thus,
secular laws and schools should replace religious laws and schools.
As well as many of his contemporaries Gökalp suggested that Turks
should nationalize Islam. He proposed that the sermons and prayers should be in
the Turkish language.11 In his understanding, Islam could be a cultural
component to promote Turkish national culture and Turkish interests, making
nationalism a modern manifestation of Islam. In that case, the interests of the
nation were above the interests of Islam. Islam could be used for national goals or
become a national religion. The Ottoman sultans called themselves the servants
of Islam. For Gökalp it was now time to have Islam serve the nation.
Nationalization of Islam
Durkheim’s books were translated into Turkish as early as 1923. Atatürk
read them in French. Gökalp’s influence on the ideological development of
Kemalism was limited as he died in 1924 before major Kemalist revolutions were
introduced. Nevertheless, in regard to his approach to Islam, Atatürk followed
Gökalp. How Atatürk dealt with Islam in real life is different from what he
thought about Islam. No matter how strong the convictions of a leader are, what a
leader can implement in a real politics is limited by the social forces of that
society. Considering the strong social power of Islam, Atatürk often acted as a
political leader not as an idealist intellectual.
7
8

Ziya Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları, (Istanbul: MEB, 1990), 22-23.
Ziya Gökalp, Türkleşmek Đslamlaşmak Muasırlaşmak, (Istanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1992),

25.
9

Ibid., 26.
Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları, 174-175.
11
Ibid., 176-177.
10
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His secularist reforms came along with a nationalization program, which
promoted nationalism as an alternative to Islam by creating a national religion.
Perhaps his most radical step was the abolishment of the centuries old Caliphate
title. The day the Caliphate was abolished on March 3, 1924, the Directory of
Religious Affairs (DRA) was founded and a state monopoly was established over
all Islamic and educational institutions. The abolishment of the Caliphate was
certainly the biggest political step toward secularization but the law by itself did
not initiate secularism because the abolishment law stated that “the meaning and
the concept of Caliphate are embedded in the government and the republic.”12
Indeed, in 1924 the official religion of the new Turkish republic was Islam and the
judicial system was largely based on Islamic laws. By 1928, the Latin alphabet
replaced the Arabic alphabet, secularism replaced the religion article in the
constitution and the Western laws replaced Islamic laws. Although Sufi orders
were prohibited, the practice of Islam or any other religion was not officially
prohibited.
In regard to religious affairs modern Turkey inherited a Sunni Islamic
structure from the Ottoman Empire. In order to protect the Sunni Islamic texture
of its subjects, the Ottomans solidified the office of Grand Mufti, Seyhulislam,
and a Sunni Islamic religious structure under the Shia Safevid threat in the
sixteenth century. As the Ottoman Empire collapsed its religious structure was
reshaped to fit the Turkish republic. Because the 1924 education monopoly law
allowed only the state employees to teach, preach and interpret Islam, no private
teaching or preaching of Islam has been allowed. Based on current regulations of
the DRA, no pupil can be registered for summer Qur’an courses to learn basic
Islamic instruction before they finish the 5th grade, when pupils are around 12 year
old.13 State monopoly over all Islamic institutions was an overly ambitious goal
that was difficult to achieve. The logistical and financial needs of the new
republic limited its abilities to reach that goal. Thus, despite the law, many Islamic
groups have provided with religious education without the state inspection.
As much as Atatürk wished to nationalize Islam, he was careful not to
destroy the main components of Islam. He discouraged political Islam but kept
Islam as a cultural component. Moving on Gökalp’s path, Atatürk ordered that
the call to prayer, ezan, had to be called in Turkish instead of Arabic. Imams
12

Reşat Genç, Türkiye’yi Laikleştiren Yasalar, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi
Yayınları, 1998), 35.
13
Diyanet Đşleri Başkanlığı Kur’an Kursları Đle Öğrenci Yurt ve Pansiyonları Yönetmeliği,
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/mevzuaticerik. asp?id=2204.
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were ordered to preach in Turkish. The Qur’an was translated into Turkish and
printed in the Latin alphabet. Still, the Kemalist criterion to create a Turkish
nation state in Anatolia was not based on secular nationalist principles; Islam
remained as a defining factor for Turkishness in the 1920s. For the Turkish state,
the ideal Turk was a Muslim Turk.14
Atatürk needed a nationalized religion, an altered Turkish Islam, to
protect secularism. Before he took a big step, Cemalettin Efendi, a Turkish imam
in Istanbul, initiated the discussion by leading a prayer in Turkish rather than in
Arabic in 1926. While a group of columnists in the Turkish press, including
Ahmed Ağaoğlu, supported the imam for his reformist act, the president of the
DRA, Rıfat Börekçi declared that prayer has to be performed in Arabic.15 After
the complaints of the mosque regulars, the imam was relocated from the DRA to
the Ministry of Education where he served as a teacher of religion.16
Soon Atatürk initiated intellectual discussions to formulate a Turkish
Islam. He asked Rûşeni Barkur, a deputy from Samsun, to write a book on
nationalization of Islam. Barkur titled his book, Din Yok Millet Var, There is No
Religion but Nation. Atatürk read the book and inscribed “Bravo, applauds” on
the margin of a paragraph where Barkur wrote “Our holy book is our nationalism,
which protects knowledge, carries creatures, embraces happiness, glorifies
Turkishness and unites all Turks. Therefore, in our philosophy the exact
equivalent of religion is nationalism.”17 Barkur’s book boosted up nationalism
over Islam but did not introduce any feasible proposal to bridge them together so
that the state could benefit. Atatürk assigned another book project to Reşit Galip,
who shortly served as the minister of education in 1928. The book, Türkün Milli
Dini: Müslümanlık, National Religion of the Turk: Islam, claimed that Islam was
originally a Turkish religion and Prophet Abraham and Prophet Muhammad had
Turkish origins.18 Atatürk apparently found this argument marginal. Galip’s off
the chart historical arguments were not included in Kemalist history textbooks
(1931-1941).
14

Soner Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is A Turk?,
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 39-40.
15
Başak Ocak Gez, “Fikirden Eyleme Türkçe Namaz Meselesi: 1920’lerin Cesur Bir
Hocası,” Toplumsal Tarih, Vol. 47 (1997): 15-19.
16
Cemal Şener, Anadilde Đbadet: Türkçe Đbadet, (Istanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1998), 80.
17
Gürbüz D. Tüfekçi, Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar-Eski ve Yeni Yazılı Türkçe Kitaplar,
(Ankara: Türkiye Đş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1983), 170-171.
18
Şener, Anadilde Đbadet, 83-84.
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A middle way had to be found for the coexistence of Islam and
secularism. Atatürk set some boundaries for his reforms in Islam. Whenever the
boundaries were crossed he stepped in. In one case he ordered the collection and
destruction of a translated book because he found the book to be extremely
offensive to Islam.19 Another book written by A. Ibrahim faced the same destiny
because it was prohibited by the Turkish government.20 The whole book is
inaccessible and its name was not recorded in the printed book catalogs of Turkey
either21; only a few pages of this book were translated into English by Lootfy
Levonian.22 In his book A. Ibrahim suggested that Turks should abandon Islam
and create a national religion. He regarded Islam as the religion of the Arabs.
Furthermore, he wrote that “[w]e must seek the religion of the Turk, the God of
the Turk, in the self-consciousness of the Turk.”23
A similar proposal was left without an owner. On June 22, 1928 Turkish
newspaper, Vakit, published a reform project, allegedly prepared by a committee
of professors from Istanbul University. The proposal embraced nationalization of
all social institutions including religion. The authors suggested that religious life
had to be reformed based on scientific ideas and methods so that religion could
match other institutions. The last section listed proposals: desks should be placed
in the mosques and people should be encouraged to enter mosques with shoes; the
language of prayer should be Turkish; Turkish versions of verses, prayers and
sermons should be used. Moreover, the proposal suggested that musical
instruments should be placed in mosques and imams and preachers should be
trained in the faculty of divinity of Istanbul University. At the end the authors
assured that they would write books and articles, organize courses and
conferences on this subject.24 As soon as it appeared in the press, the government
disowned the proposal.

19

Ahmet Gürtaş, Atatürk ve Din Eğitimi, (Ankara: Diyanet Đşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları,
1999), 25-27.
20
Dücane Cündioğlu, Bir Siyasi Proje Olarak Türkçe Đbadet I [Turkish Prayer as a
Political Project I], (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1999), 284-289.
21
Turgut Akpınar, “Đslamiyet Yerine Milli Türk Dini.” Tarih ve Toplum, 69 (1989): 42.
22
A. Ibrahim, “A Book on the Sentiment of National Religion and Genuine Religion of the
Turk,” in Lootfy Levonian. The Turkish Press: 1932-1936, (Beirut: The American Press, 1937),
37-41.
23
Ibid., 40.
24
For modern Turkish translation of the reform proposal see Đsmail Kara, Türkiye’de
Đslamcılık Düşüncesi, II, (Istanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1987), 495-499.
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In a later interview, Yusuf Ziya Yörükan, who was one of the alleged
authors of the proposal, claimed that there was no such committee, although the
first sentence of the proposal mentioned that it was prepared by one. Yörükan
told the interviewer that whatever was published in Vakit was an early draft
prepared by one person but he did not mention who that person was.25
Nevertheless, more proposals were on the way. Another Turkish newspaper,
Hakimiyet-i Milliye, devoted a book with a new version of the iman-i mufassal,
details of faith, for the Turks in August 1928. It included passages such as “I
affirm my faith in that there is no Day of Judgment for Turkey…. I believe that
good and evil comes from humans…. Ghazi [M. Kemal] is the loveliest servant of
God.”26
Moreover, Kemalist poet Behçet Kemal Çağlar attempted to rewrite the
Qur’an. He even prepared some sample verses.27 The honor book of Republican
Public Party, the first political party of the Turkish Republic, which was founded
by Atatürk, referred him as “the son of God.”28 Similar views and proposals were
expressed after Atatürk’s death as well. Arın Engin argued that prayers, fasting
and the seating arrangements could be changed based on the conditions of the age
and it was religiously legitimate.29 Another Kemalist, Osman Nuri Çelman
initiated a monthly periodical in 1957 and published several books solely for the
reformation of Islam.30 In the first issue of his periodical, Çelman declared that
“for a nation religion is not a goal but a tool”31 that could be used to promote
national interests. He compiled 54 farz, obligations, from the Bible, the Qur’an
and the Hadith along with the speeches of Atatürk. None of these proposals could
satisfy Atatürk’s desire to reconcile Islam, secular Kemalism and nationalism. He
acted cautiously in regard to daily Muslim religious rituals.

25

Ibid., 500-502.
Partially translated from Turkish. For whole Turkish version see Abdurrahman Dilipak,
Bir Başka Açıdan Kemalizm, (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1988), 34.
27
For sample verses see Ibid., 141-142.
28
Şeref Kitabı, The Honor Book, was originally published in 1938 by the Republican Public
Party. Abdurrahman Dilipak reprinted it along with additional readings from the 1920s and the
1930s. Abdurrahman Dilipak, Cumhuriyet’in Şeref Kitabı, (Istanbul: Işaret Yayınları, 1993), 17.
29
Arın Engin, Atatürkçülük’te Dil ve Din, (Istanbul: Özyürek Basımevi, 1955), 58.
30
Osman Nuri Çelman, Dinde Reform ve Kemalizm Işığı Altında Dinimiz’in Esasları,
(Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1958).
31
Osman Nuri Çelman, “Din Bir Millet Đçin Gaye Değil Vasıtadır” Dinimizde Reform:
Kemalizm 1 (1957): 13.
26
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Nationalization of Islam was not achieved conceptually but officially.
Italian laws helped the Turkish state to set a checks and balances system. In 1928
the Turkish reformers translated and adopted a Turkish penal code from fascist
Italy. Article 163 of the Turkish penal code was the backbone of state control
over religion. According to Article 163, any movement or person that aimed to
change social, economical and political and judicial system of the state even
partially based on religious principles and beliefs would be imprisoned up to
fifteen years. Appealing to religion, religious books and sentiments for personal
power would be punishable as well.32 Until it was abandoned in 1991, Article 163
was used to make sure no Islamic movement outside the state apparatus emerged
to challenge the secular state. No civil Islamic group was legally allowed to
provide religious education. The Turkish state did not want anyone other than
state employees to teach, preach and even interpret Islam. This law also curbed
Christian missionary activities and protected the de facto Muslim Turkish
structure. Nevertheless, any Islamic group close to state apparatus was let off the
radar screen.
A contemporary of Durkheim, Jean-Marie Guyau (1854-88), whose idea
of anomie was influential on Durkheim’s approach to religion, suggested that “a
religion without myth, without dogma, without cult, without rite is no more than
that somewhat bastard product, "natural religion", which is resolvable into a
system of metaphysical hypotheses.”33 Most of the above mentioned proposals
concentrated on the physical appearance of prayers and rituals. Nationalization of
Islam was partially achieved with the help of fascist punitive measures, but
forceful measures could not last forever. A myth, a dogma, or as Gökalp
suggested, a philosophical base was needed to build upon. In order to turn Turkey
into an at least partially democratic state, reconciliation of Islam and nationalism
had to be formulated. That goal could not be attained before the Second World
War. Many scholars and politicians made arguments to use the power of Islam
for national interests but the fragile balance between secularism and Islam made it
difficult to implement. Kemalist elites created some myths and even a “civil
religion” according to Donald E. Webster but the Kemalist cult was far from

32

Terörle Mücadele Kanunu, Türk Ceza Kanunu, Cezaların Đnfazı Hakkındaki Kanun, Ceza
Muhakemeleri Usulu Kanunu, (Istanbul: Beta Basım Yayım Dağıtım, 1991).
33
Marie Jean Guyau, The Non-Religion of the Future, Translated from the French.
(London: William Heinemann, 1897), 10.
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being a religion.34 Nevertheless, side effects of the intellectual investment on a
Kemalist cult can still be traced among the elites of modern Turkey.35
Privatization of Nationalism
While the Turkish state jealously controlled Islam, multi-party politics of
the Cold War brought along the privatization of nationalism, which allowed the
non-state actors to interpret nationalism. Atatürk kept a strict state control over
the interpretations of Islam and nationalism. He silenced not only the groups that
appealed the socio-political power of Islam for political gains but also the panTurkish opposition to Anatolia centered Kemalist nationalism. During his tenure
(1923-38), challengers to the Kemalist Turkish History Thesis (THT), which
connected Turkish history to ancient Sumerians and Hittites36, were either forced
into exile or marginalization. Pro-Islamic pan-Turkism led by Zeki Velidi Togan
and racist pan-Turkism led by Nihal Atsız were pushed into isolation. Anatolia
centered Kemalist nationalism had rejected pan-Turkism in the late 1920s but the
Turkish state’s anti-communist Cold War stance changed the Kemalist status quo.
As both Islam and nationalism became antidotes to communism, The Turkish
state privatized Turkish nationalism unintentionally by lifting the state monopoly
on the interpretation of nationalism. The privatization was certainly not an
economic step but a social one that allowed the optimum public use of
nationalism. Alternative understandings of history and nationalism were allowed
to be expressed outside the state apparatus. Then, civil nationalist organizations
mushroomed and became sanctuaries to conservatives, where they could raise
their Islamic arguments under the banner of nationalism. Islam could be
reasserted only after it was blended with nationalism.
Regardless of their affiliation, almost all prominent post-WWII Turkish
nationalists believed in the compatibility of Islam and nationalism37 and many
were in favor of the nationalization of Islam. Nevertheless they could not explain
how their wishes might be implemented in real politics within the secular state
structure. After its closure by the government in 1931, the semi-official nationalist
34

Donald E. Webster, Kemalism a Civil Religion? A Case Study in the Social Psychology of
Religion: The Turkish Experience, (Sey Press: 1979).
35
Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
36
Büşra Ersanlı Behar, Đktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu
(1929-1937), (Istanbul: AFA Yayıncılık, 1992).
37
Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the
Roots of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” in Modern Turkish Political Thought”, Muslim World 3-4
(1999): 360-363.
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periodical Türk Yurdu (TY) had a new statement in its first issue in 1942, “We are
neither humanist nor communist, but we are Muslim Turks.”38 According to the
editor of the TY, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, being Muslim was a requirement for
being a Turk.39 Arın Engin, an ardent Kemalist, faithful of the THT and a
member of the Turkish Historical Society, argued that “Atatürk was the greatest
Turkish-Muslim. He saved the great Turkish-Muslim nation with his trust in God.
Great God selected him to do this job.”40 According to Engin, the primary
principle of Islam was serving the nation. Interests of the nation came before
everything else. Islam had to promote the national interests.41
Along with Islam, history instruction was expected to serve the interests
of the state. Kemalist THT aimed to boost up Turkish nationalism. The THT
heavily focused on pre-Islamic Turkish history to exhibit that Turkishness, not
Islam, was the main cause of Turkish achievements in the past.42 Atatürk had
even requested special research on the pre-Islamic religions of Turks from Yusuf
Ziya Yörükan, who finished his book in 1932.43 The Ottoman rulers called
Anatolian Turkish peasants, etrak-i bi-idrak, mindless Turks. Crafting a Turkish
nation out of these despised peasants, which constituted over 80 percent of the
population, was impossible unless they were injected with a heavy dose of
nationalist pride. THT served that goal well but it could not be used for the
nationalization of Islam. Another ideological tool was required to conceptualize
the state’s nationalization of Islam.
Despite its irredentist goals, Togan’s pro-Islamic pan-Turkism proved to
be a formidable alternative to Anatolia centered Kemalist nationalism. If altered,
this nationalism could kill several birds with one stone. It could help the Turkish
state to resist an emerging communist threat by harnessing the power of Islam for
the nationalist cause. Furthermore, it could reconcile Islam and nationalism
paving the way for the nationalization of Islam; Article 163 remained in place to
make sure that no one could use Islam unless it served the interests of the state.
State prosecutors would decide whom to punish and whom to let go. Under these
38
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conditions, the best way to express Islamic ideas was to subscribe to the ideology
of pro-Islamic pan-Turkism.
Thus, almost all early Cold War Turkish
conservatives had to use nationalism to solicit their Islamic ideas. Nationalism
was already attracting Islamic intellectuals to its camp. The state’s checks and
balances system was herding intellectuals to nationalist groups.
The Turkish Left and Kemalism
Shortly after the Russian revolution, Soviet Muslims carefully crafted a
Muslim national communist ideology. National communism aimed to combine
socialism, nationalism and Islam.44 National communists and their ideologue,
Mir-Said Sultan Galiev, a Tatar communist, emphasized the anti-imperialist and
anti-colonialist principles of Marxism rather than the class struggle, dictatorship
of the proletariat and the anti-religious stance of communism.45 Sultan Galiev
engineered a new version of communism for the Islamic world. The adherents of
national communism, who were mainly the Muslim Turks of Central Asia,
proposed to secularize Islam rather than to abolish it.46 Galiev and his group were
purged from the communist party after 1928 but their ideology of Muslim national
communism, which is sometimes referred as Sultangalievism or Galievism,
spread to the Islamic world.47
The Kadro movement of the 1930s Turkey, which was the first
intellectual group to connect Kemalism with socialism, was partially inspired by
Galievism. Kadro ideologues organized their ideas in a monthly journal, Kadro.
The leading writers; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu,
Đsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Burhan Asaf Belge emphasized the anti-imperialism and
anti-colonialism of communism. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, the founder of Kadro,
belittled the significance of Ziya Gökalp as an intellectual and not surprisingly
disagreed with Gökalp’s understanding of historical materialism and Marxism,
which was critical toward Marxism. Historical materialism served as a guide for
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Aydemir and Kadro.48 Kadro was published for three years before it was shut
down by the state in 1934.
Another group that connected Kemalism to socialism was the Yön
movement of the 1960s. The Yön movement flourished among the authors of
Yön, a weekly political journal. The socialist founders of Yön; Doğan Avcıoğlu,
Mümtaz Soysal, and Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, reintroduced the socialist
interpretation of Kemalism. The chief ideologue of Yön, Doğan Avcıoğlu
regarded socialism as a natural outcome of Kemalism and democracy.49 This
argument left the official ideology, Kemalism, vulnerable to socialism. Because
the socialist intellectuals embraced Kemalism by interpreting it as a leftist
ideology, Kemalism alone could not create a strong opposition to the rising power
of socialism. The socialist interpretation of Kemalism weakened the Kemalist
ideology. Using Kemalism as a shield, socialist groups could spread their ideas in
Turkey.
Evolution of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970) was the middle man as well as a
respected fatherly figure among pan-Turkists. Prominent pan-Turkists of Cold
War Turkey, such as Nihal Atsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkan, and Đbrahim Kafesoğlu
and Osman Turan were either students or colleagues of Togan. Before he became
a history professor in Istanbul University in 1925, Togan had been the president of
the defunct Başkırdistan Republic (1917-1920) in the Northern Caucasus until the
communist takeover. He was actively involved in the Basmaji resistance
movement against the Soviets. In 1932 Togan was forced to leave his post in IU
because of his disagreement with the Kemalist THT. As opposed to Kemalist
THT’s non-irredentist Anatolian Turkish nationalism, Togan embraced a larger
concept of Turkish nationalism, including the Turks of the Caucasus and
Turkestan. After Atatürk’s death Togan returned to IU in 1939. Along with many
pan-Turkists, Togan, Atsız and Alparslan Türkeş, who later became the political
leader of pan-Turkist Nationalist Action Party, were tried and acquitted during the
pan-Turkist purge of the government in 1944. The purge made them more popular
among pan-Turkists.
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While his proudly fascist and racist student Atsız was distant to Islam,
Togan believed in the combined power of Islam and Turkish nationalism.50 In
1950, Togan’s close colleague, the historian Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, became the
minister of foreign affairs from the Democrat Party. A serious scholar/social
engineer Togan became the founding president of the Islamic Research Institute in
1953.51 The foundation of the IRI was one of the big steps for the nourishment of
Islam in Turkey. Although in his early career Togan was a teacher in a Muslim
Tartar madrasa, he was not in favor of giving up his free will for the guidance of
religion in life.52 He was raised in a religiously conscious family with an
extensive knowledge of Islam. His father was an imam attached to the
Naqshbandi Sufi order. In his youth, Togan had originally considered Shamanism
as a potential Turkish national religion and even memorized some Shamanist
prayers but he later concluded that Shamanism could not become an attractive
religion for the masses.53
Togan was in favor of reforming Islam based on scientific principles.54
However, he never explained how Islam could be reformed based on scientific
principles. He was neither the first nor the last scholar to suggest the reformation
of Islam. Indeed, what scholars often meant by the reformation of Islam was the
reinterpretation of Islam based on modern conditions. For instance, in order to
strengthen Islamic consciousness, Togan suggested the study of commonly
respected Islamic scholars in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, only after the outdated
parts of these works were eliminated.55
Considering the early twentieth century arguments on whether or not
praying in Turkish was acceptable in Islam56, Togan referred to an unpracticed
fetva, ruling, of Ebu Hanefi, which allowed praying in Farsi.57 Togan’s main
argument was that the Turks converted into Islam with their own free will
50
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“without any compulsion”58 and they “regarded the Qur’an as their national holy
book.”59 Togan embraced the Qur’an as it is rather than initiating any change on
the Qur’an or on the main principles of Islam as it had been proposed in the earlier
reform plans. Togan pulled examples from the early Turkish Muslim states of the
Karakhanids and the Seljuks and argued that as soon as Turks converted Islam
they separated Islam and politics.60 Indeed, it was the case when the Seljuk sultan
Tugrul Bey (1038-1063) entered Baghdad in 1055. Caliph, Al-Qaim (10311075), remained as the religious leader while Tugrul Bey was the political head.
Togan solid arguments, which were knitted with examples from the Turkish
history, helped to bridge the gap between Islam and secularism in modern Turkey.
Togan was in favor of using the appeal of Islam to stop communism. He
was not in favor of making Islam the most dominant political force that would
require a regime change. Like his other compatriots, Togan’s preference was that
Islam should serve the interests of the state. Indeed, when both the Turkish state
and Islamic culture were challenged by communism from the 1950s to the late
1970s, the interests of Islam and the state were the same. This political reality
provided a respected place for Islam among the Turkish nationalists paving the
road for the rise of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS).
The ideas developed by Togan were later matured and formulated by his
student Đbrahim Kafesoğlu and colleague, Osman Turan, a prominent historian
and a later editor of Türk Yurdu. They prepared the historical philosophy of the
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which served as the core of TIS ideology. The TIS
ideologues argued that pre-Islamic and Islamic Turkish history were linear,
contradicting the Kemalist THT’s efforts to distinguish them. Osman Turan
advocated that the Turkish states in both periods worked for the same goal of
establishing Nizâm-ı Âlem, the world order.61 Despite conversion to Islam,
Turkish political goals, according to TIS ideologues remained the same. Since
they saw history as continuity, they argued that modern Turkey had to adopt the
same goal of creating the world order. The liberation of the Turks in Central Asia
would be the first step toward that goal.
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Turan and Kafesoğlu’s theories and even narratives were strikingly
similar. Indeed, Turan blamed Kafesoğlu for plagiarizing his work.62 Both
argued that pre-Islamic Turkish religion was monotheistic and very similar to
Islam. Therefore, Turks easily converted to Islam. Islam thus was the most
natural religion for the Turks and Turkish national consciousness could not be
kept in faiths other than Islam. One slight difference between the two was the fact
that Turan acknowledged that pre-Islamic Turkish tribes had followed different
religions including a monotheist one63 while Kafesoğlu argued that the totemic
beliefs and Shamanism were not originally Turkish, that such beliefs came from
neighboring nations.64
Kafesoğlu originally had claimed in 1964 that Turks brought Shamanist
Turkish cultural components into Islam and created a unique combination of the
Turkish-Islamic culture.65 This original argument connected pre-Islamic and
Islamic Turkish history but Kafesoğlu later changed his theory arguing that
Shamanism was not an original Turkish religion. He concluded that pre-Islamic
Turks believed that there was one god in the sky, the sky god, gök tanrı. Thus,
Kafesoğlu named this religion, gök-tanrı dini, sky god religion. The sky god
religion was the Turkish national religion.66 Although Kafesoğlu’s facts changed,
his analysis remained the same.67
Kafesoğlu disagreed with Togan in regard to the origins of the Turks and
the Mongols. Togan argued that the Turks and the Mongols were from the same
ethnic and racial origin68 but Kafesoğlu claimed the Turks were from the
“brakisefal” white race while the Mongols were from the “dolikosefal
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Mongoloid.”69 Nevertheless, in regard to the compatibility of Islam and
nationalism, Islam and secularism and Kemalism, their views were parallel. Both
believed that the Turkish cultural features largely carried throughout the Turkish
history from the pre-Islamic period to the present created a unique Turkish
understanding of Islam.
Togan, Turan and Kafesoğlu all argued that the rise of Turkish
nationalism predated modernity. Kafesoğlu claimed that the Turkish nationalism
was the first nationalism in the world. He dated the beginning of Turkish
nationalism to the Asian Huns from the first century B.C.70 Furthermore, he
claimed that the first practice of secularism was seen among the Turks71and the
Turks founded the first states in the world history.72 In regard to Turkish identity,
Kafesoğlu took a civic nationalist stand. According to Kafesoğlu, whoever was
raised with Turkish culture, spoke Turkish and felt Turkish could be regarded as
Turkish.73 He did not list the Turkish blood connection as a prerequisite to be a
Turk.
In regard to their approach to democratic politics, the TIS ideologues
were only slightly different from each other. Togan was in favor of a democratic
parliamentary system rather than an authoritarian administration. He was
convinced that the pre-Islamic Turkish leaders in history were not authoritarian.
Even Genghis Khan, whom Togan considered a Turk, could not be able to bend
the decision of majority.74 Turan and Kafesoğlu were supporters of the spread of
democracy in Turkey as well. Turan served as a deputy from the Democrat Party
(1954-1960) and later from the Justice Party (1965-1967). Turan argued that none
of the reforms brought from Europe was embraced as much as democracy.75
Kafesoğlu’s support of democracy was conditional. He believed that
democracy could be successful only if its practice did not contradict the cultural
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norms of society.76 For Kafesoğlu, western ideology that aimed to spread
democracy into every aspect of society was “the safest way to take humanity into
salvation.”77 Kafesoğlu argued that nationalism and democracy were compatible
and they fulfilled each other. He was convinced that a democracy without
nationalism or nationalism without a democracy could not function properly.78
Nevertheless, the limitless freedoms of democracy bothered him. He declared
that “[i]n order to save our democracy from being a victim of attractive but
artificial concepts of absolute freedom and equality, we only need to organize
political, administrative, judicial, scientific and educational institutions based on
Turkish nationalist principles and fill these institutions based on national
interests.”79 Interestingly, Kafesoğlu proposed the take-over of the state by
nationalist forces and still believed that this action would be democratic. Along
with many Cold War scholars of Turkey, Kafesoğlu understood democracy
mainly as a way to elect leaders in free elections. The 1961 Turkish constitution
introduced freedom of expression, freedom of press and many other freedoms that
come with democracy. They were new concepts for many in the 1960s Turkey.
Philosophy into Ideology
Togan largely contributed to the evolution of the TIS historical
philosophy. Kafesoğlu brought this philosophy that intertwined Islam and
Turkishness into daily politics and turned it into an ideology. The 1969 congress
of the pan-Turkist Republican Peasants Nation Party80 was a turning point for the
pan-Turkists. TIS adherents came to the 1969 congress well prepared with a
strong ideological weapon, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Kafesoğlu challenged
Türkeş for the party leadership. Kafesoğlu could not win the party leadership but
the TIS ideology did. In this congress, the name of the party was changed to the
Nationalist Action Party (NAP), while the party flag was changed from the grey
wolf, a pre-Islamic Turkish symbol, to three crescents, an Islamic symbol, over a
red background.81 Furthermore, in this congress, Türkeş embraced the motto of
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the TIS adherents: “we are as Turk as Tanrı Mountain and as Muslim as Hira
Mountain.”82 This motto has been used by the pro-Islamic pan-Turkists since the
early 1960s. The Turkish world order theory of the TIS was undeniably attractive
for the pan-Turkist NAP. Nevertheless, the “Nine Lights” ideology that set the
goals of the RPNP was still embraced by the party leader, Alparslan Türkeş in the
1970s.83
In 1970, Kafesoğlu founded the nationalist think-thank, Aydınlar Ocağı,
Intellectuals’ Hearth (IH), whose goal was to create a common ground ideology
for the Turkish political right. The TIS became the core of this common ground
ideology. The political Islamic parties of Necmettin Erbakan, collaborated with
the IH as much as it served their goals. The Kemalist pragmatic approach to
Islam became a starting point for the IH. Because the TIS and its outlet the IH
served the primary Cold War interest of the state, curbing communism, TIS found
its way into public education system. Kafesoğlu authored the new history
textbooks in 197684 and TIS ideas dominated the education system in the 1980s.
The military junta (1980-1983) and the post junta civilian governments let the TIS
dominate the Turkish education system.85 The TIS promoted Islam as a cultural
factor along with its prayers and rituals, but discouraged political Islam. As
opposed to the revolutionary premises of socialism and political Islam, the TIS
ideology did not have an aim to overthrow the Kemalist regime. Thus, the TIS
managed to attract support from the official circles becoming the de facto
nationalist ideology. The TIS fulfilled the need of a national religion Atatürk had
planned.
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Conclusion
To sum up, none of the ambitious projects of the early republican period
(1923-1950) to nationalize Islam initiated a practical model to provide with a
peaceful coexistence of Islam, secularism, nationalism and Kemalism. The
attempts to nationalize Islam created several consequences, some of which were
perhaps not intended. Although being Muslim was never a prerequisite for the
Turkish citizenship, several proposals to nationalize Islam kept Islam in the core
of Turkish identity and made Islam de facto precondition for Turkishness even at
the peak of secularization in the 1930s. In all these efforts, the Turkish state
monopolized the interpretations of Islam and nationalism. Only the state
employees were allowed to teach, preach and interpret Islam. Similarly, only the
Anatolia-centered non-expansionist nationalism was embraced, while panTurkism was pushed to the periphery.
As the socialist threat emerged in the early Cold War, Islam and
nationalism became antidotes to socialism. Keeping the balance of power between
Kemalist secularism and pro-Islamic nationalism required a peaceful
reconciliation. In the early republican period (1923-1950), the Turkish state had
intentionally kept pan-Turkism at bay in order to prevent a Soviet aggression.
Once the Soviet threat turned from a possibility to a reality in the early Cold War
(1950-1970), the Turkish state had no more reason to curb pan-Turkism. The
Turkish state lifted its monopoly on nationalism by allowing public intellectuals
and non-state actors to spread their nationalist interpretations.
Privatization of nationalism started a competition among several
nationalist schools of thought. From racist pan-Turkists and racist Anatoliacentered nationalists to pro-Islamic pan-Turkists, Turkish nationalist ideas
competed to become the mainstream Turkish nationalism. Under the close watch
of the state, the pro-Islamic pan-Turkists brought Islam from the core of Turkish
identity to the surface. A new historical philosophy, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
(TIS), connected pre-Islamic and Islamic periods of the Turkish history. The
ideological fathers of the TIS reconciled not only Islam and secular Kemalism but
also Islam and nationalism. By embracing the Kemalist ideology, the TIS kept
Islam as part of the Turkish cultural identity but rejected alternative ideologies
from socialism and fascism to political Islam that would have required
abandonment of Kemalism. The TIS ideologues proposed no change in the daily
practice of Islam as opposed to the marginal proposals of the early republican
period. This non-interventionist approach was welcomed by the conservative
History Studies
Volume 1/1 2009

From Nationalization of Islam to Privatization of Nationalism...

103

circles. By 1970, the TIS became the most formidable nationalist interpretation.
As the TIS turned from a historical philosophy into an ideology in the 1970s, it
dominated the Turkish history curriculum from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s
and made Islam de facto prerequisite of the Turkish national identity.
After the military tutelage of the 1980s ended, a glimpse of freedom of
expression and the TIS ideology was challenged by liberalism and political Islam
in the 1990s. Moreover, removal of Article 163 from Turkish penal code in 1991
partially broke state monopoly on Islam and allowed the expression of different
interpretations of Islam other than the official one. Nevertheless, in the post-Cold
War Turkish intellectual life no ideology has emerged to challenge de facto
existence of Islam in the Turkish national identity.
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